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As abordagens iniciais da psicologia supunham que a vida mental era o assunto apropriado desta nova ciência e que 
relatos verbais introspectivos e os tempos de reação eram os métodos apropriados para dar suporte às inferências sobre esse 
assunto. O problema foi que essas abordagens iniciais eram vagas, pouco confiáveis e geralmente ineficazes. O behaviorismo 
metodológico surgiu como uma tentativa de lidar com esse problema, afirmando que as teorias e explicações em psicologia, 
bem como os conceitos que eles implantaram, devem ser acordados. A chave para este acordo era que os psicólogos deveriam 
falar apenas do que é observável, embora falar de eventos mentais inobserváveis fosse posteriormente permitido se fossem 
designados como construtos teóricos que eram definidos operacionalmente por meio de sua relação com os eventos 
observáveis. Essa visão posterior permanece proeminente na psicologia tradicional. O behaviorismo radical da análise do 
comportamento de B. F. Skinner oferece uma alternativa baseada em uma análise crítica das fontes comportamentais de 
controle sobre um determinado termo. Em particular, o conceito behaviorista radical de eventos comportamentais privados 
fornece uma explicação unificada da natureza em termos comportamentais. 
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Early approaches to psychology assumed that mental life was the appropriate subject matter of the new science, and 
that introspective verbal reports and reaction times were the appropriate methods to support inferences about that subject 
matter. The problem was that these early approaches were vague, unreliable, and generally ineffective. Methodological 
behaviorism arose as an attempt to deal with this problem by asserting that theories and explanations in psychology, as well 
as the concepts they deployed, should be agreed upon. The key to agreement was that psychologists should talk only about 
observables, although talk of mental unobservables was later permitted if they were designated as theoretical constructs that 
were operationally defined through their relation to observables.  This later view remains prominent in traditional 
psychology.  The radical behaviorism of B. F. Skinner’s behavior analysis offers an alternative based on a critical analysis of 
the behavioral sources of control over a given term.  In particular, the radical behaviorist concept of private behavioral events 
provides a unified account of nature in behavioral terms. 
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This article is taken from material I developed over the years to help in my own teaching on the topic of methodological behaviorism. I 
offer it here in the hope others will find it useful.  In keeping with the instructional goal of the article, references are at a minimum. In 
addition, both the language and the arguments are more informal than in other articles.  If I have fallen short in the execution, I apologize 
and ask for the reader’s tolerance. I can only say the contingencies haven’t finished with me yet. Correspondence concerning the article 
should be addressed to the author at jcm@uwm.edu, or at his home address: 1861 E. Fox Lane; Fox Point, WI 53217; USA. 
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METHODOLOGICAL BEHAVIORISM 
 Methodological behaviorism is a prescriptive 
thesis for how to do psychology. Underlying the thesis is 
the assertion that science requires agreement. Then, given 
that observables can be agreed upon and unobservables 
cannot, the thesis holds that psychological theories and 
explanations, as well as the concepts they deploy, should 
be expressed in terms of publicly observable events, 
variables, and relations, rather than unobservable mental 
phenomena. This thesis emerged during the first quarter of 
the 20th century.  However, the thesis has been interpreted 
in at least two different ways over the last 100 years. 
 
INTERPRETATION #1 OF METHODOLOGICAL 
BEHAVIORISM 
 The first and original interpretation of 
methodological behaviorism was that psychological 
theories and explanations should only describe relations 
between publicly observable stimuli and responses, for 
example, in an S-R model, and should remain silent on 
everything else.  Psychologists could even assume that 
mental causes existed.  However, such causes should not 
be directly included in psychological theories and 
explanations.  Anything about the mental should be dealt 
with by another discipline, such as philosophy or religion, 
but not science, which needed agreement through 
observability.  Psychologists could further assume that 
explanations developed under Interpretation #1 would be 
scientifically satisfactory.  This early interpretation still has 
some advocates, but it began to lose favor around 1930.  
Since 1950 a second interpretation has largely replaced the 
first. 
 
INTERPRETATION #2 OF METHODOLOGICAL 
BEHAVIORISM 
 The second interpretation is that psychologists 
can include unobservables in their theories and 
explanations after all, but only if those unobservables are 
designated as theoretical constructs (e.g., logical 
constructs, theoretical terms) and operationally defined.  
The operational definition specifies the publicly observable 
factors entailed in the measurement of the construct.  A 
construct might well be held to refer to some unobservable 
mental or cognitive phenomenon, but the operational 
definition in terms of observables makes the construct 
scientifically respectable because the evidence for the 
mental phenomenon can then be agreed upon.  For 
example, the construct could be operationally defined in 
terms of (a) behavioral measures (e.g., taking reaction time 
to indicate the speed at which some mental process is said 
to operate) or (b) physiological measures (e.g., with a more 
contemporary technology, taking fMRI to reveal neural 
correlates of mental processes).  In this way unobservables 
are included only indirectly, not directly.  As a result, the 
approach is taken to satisfy scientific concerns. 
 The common method associated with 
Interpretation #2 is to infer an O variable (“organismic”) 
inside the organism in some sense as a theoretical 
construct. The function of this construct is to mediate the 
relation between S and R.  By mediate is meant that 
observable external stimuli activate or trigger one or more 
unobservable intervening or mediating entities that are 
causally connected in some complex but systematic way to 
an ensuing observable response.  The result is that the 
subject is held to be in contact with only the mediating 
entity, not the observable external environment.  A generic 
name for this approach is mediational S – O – R 
neobehaviorism.  Learning theories, such as those of 
Tolman or Hull-Spence, are suitable examples.  A 
mediational approach with operationally defined 
theoretical constructs is currently the most popular because 
it allows researchers and theorists to have their cake of 
mental causes and eat it, too. 
 
EXHAUSTIVE OR PARTIAL OPERATIONAL 
DEFINITIONS? 
 From the mid-1930s to the late 1940s 
psychologists debated a further matter in connection with 
Interpretation #2 (MacCorquodale & Meehl, 1948). This 
debate concerned whether the operational definition of the 
theoretical construct should be regarded as exhaustive (i.e., 
the intervening variable interpretation) or partial (i.e., the 
hypothetical construct interpretation). As MacCorquodale 
and Meehl cast this distinction, if the theoretical construct 
is used or applied in no other situation, then its operational 
definition in terms of the current use or application 
provides the total meaning for the construct, and its 
meaning as expressed in terms of the current use or 
application is regarded as exhaustive. In simple terms, the 
construct has no surplus meaning. Additionally, because an 
exhaustive definition provides only a summary or labor-
saving device in a single, selected application, the 
construct is not assumed to refer to some variable that 
actually exists. 
 Alternatively, as MacCorquodale and Meehl 
(1948) also wrote, if the construct is used or applied in 
other situations, then its definition in terms of the current 
use or application provides only one of its several possible 
meanings. These other uses or applications provide their 
own meanings, and further unexamined uses or 
applications suggest even further, to-be-discovered 
meanings.  If so, then its meaning as expressed in terms of 
the current use or application is regarded as only partial.  In 
simple terms, the construct does have surplus meaning.  In 
any event, because a partial definition admits multiple uses 
or applications, the construct may be assumed to refer to 
some variable that actually exists.  If it did not, how could 
it have multiple uses or applications?  Since the late 1940s, 
psychologists have favored the hypothetical construct 
interpretation because it yields greater generality and 
flexibility in theory development, system building, and 
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explanatory application.  Some writers may even label the 
hypothetical construct interpretation as a third 
interpretation, rather than a variation on the second. 
 
INFLUENCE OF METHODOLOGICAL 
BEHAVIORISM ON SCIENTIFIC METHOD 
 Finally, a particular set of research and 
explanatory practices also developed in concert with 
Interpretation #2 of methodological behaviorism.  According 
to these practices, the appropriate form of research was to 
formulate S – O – R theories about mediating organismic 
variables (the “O” above).  Predictions (i.e., deductions) of 
those theories are then tested under controlled conditions 
using various experimental groups according to a 
conventionally approved experimental design, with publicly 
observable independent and dependent variables, 
operationally defined theoretical terms, and so forth.  The 
resulting data are evaluated using null-hypothesis inferential 
statistics to determine the probability that any observed 
differences are attributable to chance.  Outcomes consistent 
with the predictions of the theories are taken to validate the 
theory that appeals to the mediating O variable.  Once 
validated, the theory is elevated to the status of a law, and 
the whole approach, called the “covering law” approach, is 
taken to explain the event in question.  Taken together, these 
practices are codified in courses in statistics and 
experimental design in most college textbooks and curricula. 
 
WHY SO SOME PSYCHOLOGISTS ADVOCATE 
METHODOLOGICAL BEHAVIORISM? 
 During the first quarter of the 20th century, the 
classic introspective approaches to psychology (e.g., 
structuralism, functionalism) talked of events, variables, and 
relations that were unobservable and couldn’t be agreed 
upon.  For example, what did it mean to say a psychologist 
was investigating the “texture” of the “sensation of green”?  
Methodological behaviorism as represented in Interpretation 
#1 above—remaining silent on anything that wasn’t 
observable and speaking only of observable S-R relations—
arose in an attempt to resolve these concerns, by 
emphasizing events, variables, and relations that could be 
agreed upon.  After a few years, most psychologists came to 
think that the first interpretation was far too restrictive and 
not scientifically satisfactory after all—it had considerable 
difficulty accommodating the richness and flexibility of 
behavior.  Something more epistemologically sophisticated 
than the observables of an S–R model seemed to be 
necessary.  After all, other sciences—notably theoretical 
physics— seemed to have advanced by postulating 
unobservables in the form of theoretical constructs, so why 
shouldn’t psychology be allowed the same techniques? 
 Interpretation #2 came into favor when 
psychologists realized that new ideas about theory 
development based on operationism didn’t actually require 
the psychologists to remain silent on the mental.  Including 
unobservable mental causes as operationally defined 
theoretical constructs was judged to be scientifically 
legitimate and not to conflict with the thesis of 
methodological behaviorism.  Again, this indirect approach 
allowed psychologists to agree upon the meaning of 
unobservables, and allowed for the entire enterprise to be 
considered scientific.  
 
WHY DO RADICAL BEHAVIORISTS OPPOSE 
METHODOLOGICAL BEHAVIORISM? 
 Radical behaviorists agree that classical 
introspective approaches to psychology are a problem.  
Radical behaviorists also agree that attempts to reduce all 
forms of behavior to an S–R model with only observable 
factors are a problem.  Nevertheless, radical behaviorists 
reject methodological behaviorism as a solution for either or 
usually both of two reasons.  First, by denying or ignoring 
certain events inside the skin, Interpretations #1 and #2 of 
methodological behaviorism fail to address an important 
aspect of human behavior, by failing to accept that those 
events can be understood as fundamentally behavioral in 
nature and functionally related to antecedents and 
consequences in the environment.  To be sure, at present 
many of these events inside the skin have to be dealt with 
inferentially.  Nevertheless, until our technology advances to 
the point that they may be dealt with directly, there seems to 
be no good reason to rule these events out of consideration 
just because they are not accessible from the vantage point 
of an observer.   
 Second, Interpretation #2 of methodological 
behaviorism implicitly accepts a mentalistic view of the 
behavior of both (a) the subject or participant and (b) the 
scientist.  As we have seen, methodological behaviorists 
commonly attribute the behavior of a subject to the 
mediating O variables.  The origin of the O variables lies in 
mentalism, which makes the entire enterprise little more than 
an institutionally disguised form of mentalism.  Moreover, 
the behavior of a scientist is similarly conceived of in 
mentalistic terms, in virtue of the assertion that treating 
mental causes of behavior as operationally defined 
theoretical constructs makes the approach the scientifically 
respectable. A theoretical construct is not the same as a 
discriminative stimulus in operant verbal contingencies.  
Rather, it is held to be a logical device that is part of 
mentalistic, nonbehavioral account of verbal behavior.  
Fundamental in the account is an assumption that words are 
symbols that have entities called “meanings” that are 
attached to them. In contrast, for radical behaviorists 
engaging in science is operant behavior—typically verbal.  
Accordingly, scientific behavior—both verbal and 
nonverbal—may be analyzed in terms of contingencies.  
Arguing in terms of constructs moves the analysis of 
scientific behavior from the domain of behavioral relations 
and verbal contingencies into the domain of a mentalistic 
metaphysics and a mentalistic epistemology about both 
subjects and scientists. 
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 Ultimately, radical behaviorists argue 
methodological behaviorism is troublesome on pragmatic 
grounds, just as is any other form of mentalism: It doesn’t 
lead to effective prediction and control, despite any claims 
that operationism guarantees the scientific integrity of the 
unobservable concepts. Radical behaviorists argue that 
unfortunately, methodological behaviorism is the orthodox 
position in contemporary psychological theorizing. 
 To be sure, operational definitions are very 
important for science, but in a different sense than in 
methodological behaviorism.  That is, they don’t make talk 
of the mental scientifically legitimate, as methodological 
behaviorists assume they do. Rather, operational 
definitions help identify the extent to which scientific 
operations and the resulting data, rather than social-cultural 
traditions, linguistic practices, and faulty metaphors, 
participate in the contingencies that govern our analytic 
and explanatory terms.  Traditional operationism and 
methodological behaviorism adopt a mentalistic, referential 
view of verbal behavior, and institutionalize mentalism 
about both the behavior of subjects or participants, on the 
one hand, and the scientist who theorizes about and seeks 
to explain that behavior, on the other.  In particular, the 
epistemological stance of the latter may be designated an 
epistemological dualism, in that it unselfconsciously 
advocates mentalistic strategies for dealing with what it 
accepts as mental causes of the behavior of subjects or 
participants. 
 
PRIVATE BEHAVIORAL EVENTS 
 Of concern to many researchers and theorists 
throughout the developments reviewed above was how to 
incorporate events that are accessible only to the individual 
who was behaving.  Skinner (1945, 1953) wrote 
extensively about this matter when he wrote of private 
behavioral events.  The two types of private events were 
(a) verbal reports about felt conditions and sensations of 
the body, and (b) covert operant behavior.  The first type 
included how we come to talk about our aches and pains.  
The second type included the time-honored topics of 
consciousness, as a repertoire of self-descriptive behavior 
that had discriminative value, and thinking, as covert 
behavior taking various forms, from daydreaming to self-
analytical behavior that also contributed to discriminative 
control. 
 To use the second type of private events as an 
example, these events were not from a mediating mental 
domain, as in S-O-R neobehaviorism.  Rather, these events 
were in the behavioral domain, and there seemed no good 
reason to exclude them simply because they were not 
observable to others. They were carried out by the same 
response systems as overt forms of behavior, just reduced 
in scale. They were probably even acquired in overt form, 
then receded to the covert level because the overt forms 
were punished, or because the covert forms were 
expedient. Skinner offered an interpretation of such events 
in terms of operant behavior and contingencies of 
reinforcement in which the verbal community played a 
significant role. Although private events of others might be 
inferential for observers, they are not inferential for actors. 
Rather, they are a function of the same types of variables 
and relations that participate in publicly observable events. 
 
BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS AND MENTAL TERMS 
 Behavior analysts argue that mentalism is the 
dominant explanatory orientation in psychology. In simple 
language, mentalism consists in the appeal to unobservable 
structures from a nonbehavioral domain in causal 
explanations of behavior. Typically, the domain is that of 
“mind.” Further, behavior analysts are opposed to 
mentalism. To be sure, some psychological theories and 
explanations do contain terms and concepts that at first 
glance appear to be mental. Nonetheless, for behavior 
analysts, some of those terms and concepts aren’t actually 
mentalistic because they do not appeal to causal entities 
from a nonbehavioral domain. Rather, they reflect genuine 
events, variables, and relations worthy of study in their 
own right. 
The five categories in the table below suggest a 
way to understand terms commonly thought to be mental 
terms. The terms in columns 1-4 of the table reflect 
observations and extensions in the same domain that 
behavior takes place. As such, these terms help us to 
understand how behavior is related to environmental 
circumstances. However, the terms do not tact causes of 
behavior. The causes of behavior are in the contingencies.  
In general, the terms reflect various features or aspects of 
the behavioral events that the contingencies generate.  Let 
us now review these terms. 
 
Table 1. Five category events that provide ways to understand terms commonly thought to be mental terms. 
Private behavioral 
events 
Physiology Behavioral dispositions Behavioral relations Explanatory fictions 
Verbal reports  Gap within Propositional attitudes Attention  Folk psychology 
Covert operants  Gap between Intentional idiom Discrimination  Language practices 
   Generalization Inappropriate metaphors 
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 Terms in column 1 have a source of control in private 
behavioral events.  These terms tact verbal reports 
about internal sensations and feelings (e.g., 
statements about personal experiences involving pain, 
pleasure, anxiety) or covert operants (e.g., thinking, 
problem solving). 
 Terms in column 2 have a source of control in 
physiology.  These terms tact physiological processes 
in the gaps either within a behavioral event (e.g., 
recruitment) or between behavioral events (e.g., 
consolidation). 
 Terms in column 3 have a source of control in 
behavioral dispositions. These terms tact the 
probability of a particular form of behavior in 
particular circumstances (e.g., propositional attitudes, 
the intentional idiom:  belief, desire, intention). 
 Terms in column 4 have a source of control in 
stimulus control relations. These terms tact the 
influence of antecedent environmental circumstances 
on behavior (e.g., attention, discrimination, 
generalization). 
 
Terms related to column 5 may be traced more to 
irrelevant and extraneous social factors, such as conforming 
to authority or uncritically accepting social conventions and 
culturally conditioned practices, than to the tact relation.  
When cited as causes, terms with these sources of control are 
simply explanatory fictions: supposed acts, states, 
mechanisms, processes, entities, and structures (e.g., 
encoding, representations, storage-retrieval) in a supposed 
domain (e.g., hypothetical, cognitive, mental, spiritual, 
psychic, or subjective) that differs from the behavioral 
domain.  These terms come about largely through spurious 
echoic, textual, and intraverbal processes.  These supposed 
acts, states, etc. are evident in folk psychology, our appeals 
to inappropriate metaphors, and follow from our linguistic 
practices, such as when we convert adjectives and adverbs 
into nouns and then assume the nouns then stand for causal 
acts, states, etc. that really exist in a nonbehavioral, mental 
domain. Terms with these sources of control are troublesome 
because they ultimately lead to the counterproductive 
practices of mentalism and methodological behaviorism.  In 
much of contemporary psychology this mentalistic verbal 
behavior ironically takes the form of a mediational, S - O - R 
model of neobehaviorism.  Rather than using some 
observable measure as a proxy for an unobservable mental 
structure, as in traditional operationism and methodological 
behaviorism, Skinner’s concept of the operational analysis 
of psychological terms is concerned with identifying the 
sources of control over the verbal behavior in question, so 
that we may assess whether the verbal behavior in question 
can contribute to an effective science of behavior.  
 
 
Key terms and concepts: verbal behavior, methodological 
behaviorism, radical behaviorism, operationism, prediction 
and control, private behavioral events 
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